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Abstract: 
Mutual Fund is a topic which is of huge interest not only to researchers all over the world, but also to investors. 
Unit Trust of India as India’s first mutual fund was set up as an effective vehicle for channelizing progressively 
larger share of household savings to productive investments in the corporate sector. In 1964, Unit Trust of India 
(UTI) came up with the first mutual fund Unit Scheme, 1964, popularly known as US 64 which was the first 
open ended balanced fund. But, during late nineties, UTI faces severe challenges with its unit scheme –US 64. 
At present, mutual funds have emerged as an important segment of financial market of India, especially as a 
result of the initiatives taken by the Government of India for resolving problems relating to UTI’s US-64.  This 
paper tries to analyze the crisis faced by Unit Trust of India, specially its largest savings mobilization scheme-
US64 and evaluate  overall performance of UTI in terms of savings mobilization ,profitability, dividend 
distribution, income and expenditure pattern, investible funds, redemption and net inflow of funds. At last, the 
paper recommends some measures in overcoming the challenges faced by UTI. 
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Introduction:    
 Mutual Fund is a topic which is of huge interest not only to researchers all over the world, but also to investors. 
Mutual funds as a medium-to-long term investment option are preferred as a suitable investment option by 
investors.  The Mutual fund industry in India has appeared as a leading financial intermediary in Indian capital 
market. As of April 2006, the industry comprising of 33 Asset Management Companies managed financial 
assets of over Rs.2000 billions (equivalent of US $45 billions) contributed by an estimated 20 million investors 
spread all over the country. Majority of the funds (approximately) 96% of the funds are open-ended type and the 
remaining 4% of the funds are close-ended type. The assets have grown at a compounded annualized growth 
rate of 48 per cent over a period of four decades, 1965 – 2005, which is an evidence of the growing popularity 
of mutual funds in the country (as per the figures made available by Association of Mutual Funds in India). The 
impressive growth can be attributed to the entry of commercial banks and the private players in the mutual fund 
industry coupled with the rapid growth of the Indian capital markets during the last couple of years. The main 
objective of investing in a mutual fund scheme is to diversify risk. Though the mutual funds invest in diversified 
portfolio, the fund managers take different levels of risk in order to achieve the scheme’s objectives.                                                                                                 
   In India, mutual fund concept began in 60s for a more active mobilization of household savings to provide 
investible fund to industry. The idea of first mutual fund in India was born out of the far sighted vision of Sri 
T.Krishnamachari, the then finance minister. He wrote to the then prime minister, Pandit Nehru outlining the 
need for an institution which would serve as the conduit for these resources to the Indian capital market. In 
July1964, the concept of mutual fund took root in India when Unit Trust of India was set up with the twin 
objectives of mobilizing household savings and investing the funds in the capital market for industrial growth. 
Household sector accounted for about 80 percent of nation’s savings and only about one-third of such savings 
was available to the corporate sector. The objective was that UTI could be used as an effective vehicle for 
channelizing progressively larger share of household savings to productive investments in the corporate sector. 
In 1964, UTI came up with the first mutual fund Unit Scheme, 1964, popularly known as US 64 which was the 
first open ended balanced fund. The UTI is a public sector enterprise which was created in 1964 under the unit 
trust of India Act, 1963 passed by the Parliament. Under the provision of the Act, UTI acted as a financial 
intermediary for the purpose of mobilizing savings through the sale of units of the UTI and for investing those 
funds primarily in blue chip corporate securities .UTI was the only organization which has diversified open 
ended and close ended scheme under its management than any other public investment companies in India. 
   The impressive growth of mutual funds in India has attracted the awareness of Indian researchers, individuals 
and institutional investors during past ten years. A number of studies have been conducted to examine the 
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growth, competition, performance and regulation of mutual funds in India. The Indian mutual fund industry is 
currently in the phase of consolidation and growth stage of the product life cycle. The Indian mutual fund 
industry is no exception and the competition would intensify in the coming years as it happened in other 
industries.  
   In view of the above discussion, the present paper tries to analyse the problem faced by Unit Trust of 
India(UTI),the first and oldest mutual fund in India, specially its largest unit scheme-US 64 during recent time 
and evaluate the overall current performance in terms of fund mobilization, profitability, dividend 
distribution,investible funds, redemption  and net inflow of funds . 
 2.Evolution of mutual funds in India:  
The mutual fund industry in India started in 1963 with the formation of Unit Trust of India, at the initiative of 
the Government of India and Reserve Bank and retained its monopoly and supremacy till banking sector mutual 
fund came into operation in 1987. The history of mutual funds in India can be broadly divided into four distinct 
phases. The first three phases can be viewed as pre crisis period. 
 
First Phase – 1964-87: Unit Trust of India (UTI) was established on 1963 by an Act of Parliament. It was set up 
by the Reserve Bank of India and functioned under the Regulatory and administrative control of the Reserve 
Bank of India. In 1978 UTI was de-linked from the RBI and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) 
took over the regulatory and administrative control in place of RBI. The first scheme launched by UTI was Unit 
Scheme 1964. At the end of 1988 UTI had Rs.6,700 crores of assets under management. Therefore, Phase I 
commenced with the establishment of UTI in 1964 and the launch of Unit Scheme 1964 (US-64). During this 
phase, UTI was the only institution offering mutual fund products and it experienced a consistent growth. UTI’s 
investible funds, at market value (and including the book value of fixed assets) progressively grew from Rs.49 
crores in 1965 to Rs.219 crores in 1970-71, to Rs.1126 crores in 1980-81 and further to Rs.5,068 crores by June 
1987. By that date, its investor base had also grown to about 2 million investors. During this phase, US-64 
became increasingly popular as an alternative to bank deposits. Master share, the equity growth fund launched 
in 1986 was the first product in India to provide a dedicated vehicle for the entry of small investors into the 
equity market. It proved to be a grand marketing success. 1986 also saw the launch of India Fund, the first 
Indian off-shore fund for overseas investors which was listed on the London Stock Exchange.  
 
 Second Phase – 1987-1993 (Entry of Public Sector Funds): The spectacular performance of UTI –specially the 
first and largest open ended scheme –US 64- since its inception in 1964 and specially during 80s and upto 1997 
had given the investing public a rich experience of the operation of the mutual fund. Although the monopoly of 
UTI came to an end on 1987 when Govt. of India by amending Banking Regulation Act and Insurance Act 
permitted commercial banks and LIC & GIC to set up mutual fund, the supremacy of different schemes of UTI 
regarding aggregate investment, earning capacity, fund mobilization, dividend payment, equity investment, 
capital appreciation was much more than any other mutual funds like banking sector MFs and insurance sector 
MF up to 1997 due to efficient asset management. Therefore,1987 marked the entry of non- UTI, public sector 
mutual funds set up by public sector banks and Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and General Insurance 
Corporation of India (GIC). SBI Mutual Fund was the first non- UTI Mutual Fund established in June 1987 
followed by Canbank Mutual Fund (Dec 87), Punjab National Bank Mutual Fund (Aug 89), Indian Bank Mutual 
Fund (Nov 89), Bank of India (Jun 90), Bank of Baroda Mutual Fund (Oct 92). LIC established its mutual fund 
in June 1989 while GIC had set up its mutual fund in December 1990. 
   At the end of 1993, the mutual fund industry had assets under management of Rs.47,004 crores. 
Therefore, Phase II witnessed the advent of competition in the mutual fund industry with the launch of mutual 
funds by subsidiaries of the nationalized banks and of the two insurance corporations viz. Life Insurance 
Corporation of India and the General Insurance Corporation of India. In 1988, UTI also floated another off-
shore fund viz. The India Growth Fund which was listed on the New York Stock Exchange. During this phase, 
there was a dramatic growth in the size of the mutual fund industry with investible funds, at market value, 
increasing to Rs.53,462 crores and the number of investor accounts increasing to over 23 million. The buoyant 
equity markets in 1991-92 and tax benefits under Equity-linked Savings Schemes enhanced the attractiveness of 
equity funds. 
 Third Phase – 1993-2003 (Entry of Private Sector Funds): With the entry of private sector funds in 1993,a new 
era started in the Indian mutual fund industry, giving the Indian investors a wider choice of fund families. Also, 
1993 was the year in which the first Mutual Fund Regulations came into being, under which all mutual funds, 
except UTI were to be registered and governed. The erstwhile Kothari Pioneer (now merged with Franklin 
Templeton) was the first private sector mutual fund registered in July 1993. 
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The 1993 SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations were substituted by a more comprehensive and revised Mutual Fund 
Regulations in 1996. The industry now functions under the SEBI (Mutual Fund) Regulations1996.The number 
of mutual fund houses went on increasing, with many foreign mutual funds setting up funds in India and also the 
industry has witnessed several mergers and acquisitions. As at the end of January 2003, there were 33 mutual 
funds with total assets of Rs. 1,21,805 crores. The Unit Trust of India with Rs.44,541 crores of assets under 
management was way ahead of other mutual funds. Phase III marked the entry of private sector mutual funds 
including foreign sponsors as also the prescription in 1993 by the Securities and Exchange Board of India of 
mutual fund regulations. UTI’s Mastergain, launched in May 1992, was a phenomenal success with subscription 
of Rs.4,700 crores from 63 lakhs applicants. The investible funds, at market value, of the industry increased to 
Rs.78,655 crores and the number of investor accounts increased to 50 million.   
 Fourth Phase: 2003 and onward: This period saw in the initial year’s significant growth in the mutual fund 
industry aided by a more positive sentiment in the capital market, significant tax benefits and improvement in 
the quality of investor service. Investible funds, at market value, of the industry rose by June 2000 to over 
Rs.110,000 crores with UTI having 68% of the market share. During 1999-2000, sales mobilisation reached a 
record level of Rs.73,000 crores as against Rs.31,420 crores in the preceeding year. This trend has however 
sharply reversed in 2000-2001 and investible funds at market value have declined and there have been 
significant declines in the NAVs of funds.  
.   3. Structure of Unit Trust of India (UTI):   
 UTI is a statutory corporation established under the Unit Trust of India, Act 1963 with a view to encouraging 
saving and investment and participation in the income, profits and gains accruing to the Corporation from the 
acquisition, holding, management and disposal of securities. The Act came into force on 1st February 1964.  
The initial capital of UTI was Rs.5 crores which has been contributed as under: 
(a)  Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Rs.2.50 crores    
(b)    Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC)    Rs.0.75 crores  
(c)    State Bank of India (SBI) and its subsidiary banks  Rs.0.75 crores    
(d)    Scheduled banks (other than SBI and its subsidiary banks) and 
notified financial institutions    
Rs.1.00 crore  
  
    Rs.5.00 crores  
 The initial capital forms part of US-64 and the subscribers hold units in that Scheme. In 1975, the UTI Act was 
amended and by virtue of the amendment, the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) took over the rights 
and responsibilities of RBI under the Act and the share of the initial capital held by RBI was transferred to and 
vested in IDBI. 
   The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs and business of UTI rests in a Board of 
Trustees which exercises all powers and does all acts and things which may be exercised or done by UTI. The 
composition of the Board of Trustees is as under :  
(a)        The Chairman to be appointed by the Central Government in consultation with IDBI.  
(b)        One trustee to be nominated by RBI.  
(c)        Four trustees to be nominated by IDBI of whom not less than three shall be persons having special 
knowledge of, or experience in commerce, industry, banking, finance or investment.  
(d)        One trustee to be nominated by LIC.  
            (e)         One trustee to be nominated by SBI.  
(f)        Two trustees to be elected by other contributing institutions viz scheduled banks (other than SBI and its 
subsidiary banks) and notified financial institutions.  
(g)       An executive trustee to be appointed by IDBI, provided that such an appointment may not be necessary if 
the Chairman is whole-time.  
The Board meets not less than six times a year and at least once in two months.  
The Act provides that where the whole of the initial capital has been refunded to the contributory institutions, 
the Central Government may, after consultation with IDBI, by order, provide for reconstitution of the Board. 
The Act also provides that regulations made by the Board have to be with the prior approval of IDBI. The Act 
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provides that 90% of the net income of the Scheme or 10% dividend, whichever is lower has to be distributed to 
the unit holders under the scheme.  
 There is an Executive Committee which, subject to such general or special directions as the Board may, from 
time to time, give, has the power to deal with any matter within the competence of UTI. The Trust is authorized 
to establish one or more reserve funds by transferring such sums as it may deem fit, out of the amount of the 
income of the Trust not distributed to the contributing institutions or unit holders. Where a reserve fund is 
created specially for the purposes of any unit scheme it has to be applied or utilised only for the benefit of the 
unit holders under that unit scheme and for such purposes and in such manner as the Board may determine.  
  4. Analysis of performance of Unit Trust of India: 
One of the way of measuring performance of a mutual fund is by way of looking into the amount of income 
generated .Mutual fund generates  income through the following sources: dividend, interest, profit on sale or 
redemption of assets, profit on inter-scheme transfer, other income. 
                             [Insert Table-1 here]                     
                   
Mutual funds use their income for various purposes i.e. to meet expenses relating to fund management, to 
distribute dividend to investors, to allocate to reserve account and to meet other requirements including prior 
adjustment in accounts. If we compare the income and expenditure profile of UTI with that of the industry, two 
major factors of UTI’s success can be distinguished. Firstly, UTI retains the status of the most cost effective 
fund manager spending only 11% of its earning to meet overall expenses of management of funds during 1992-
93 which is against the industry’s average of nearly 15% during the same period. During the period of 
comparison, UTI’s expense ratio is found to be much lesssor than that of the industry average. Secondly, UTI is 
the very liberal distributors of income and an investor friendly mutual fund. With no exception, in all the three 
years of analysis, the distribution policy of UTI is found to be better than that of competitors. In the year 1992-
93, UTI distributed nearly 63% of its earning to its unit holders, when the industry average is only 59% whereas 
other public sector mutual funds distributed only 44% of their earnings. 
Another area of concern is growing shares of expenses i.e an increasing spending tendency of UTI which rises 
from 4% to 11% within three years. Over a period of three years from 1990-91 to 1992-93, it has gone up about 
3 times and eaten away about 12% of income generated. This ever increasing trend of expenses should be 
looked into by the regulatory organizations and by the mutual funds themselves in order to minimize wasteful 
expenses and improve the efficiency of fund management. 
Another disturbing factor is that only a smaller portion of income generated is being transferred to general 
reserve. It was 11.62% in 1990-91 and it came down to 9.92% in 1992-93. 
                                [Insert Table-2 here]   
                
US64, the biggest mutual fund scheme in India, is more than four decades old and its corpus since its inception 
has increased manyfolds which upto the end of 1992-93 is Rs13058 crore as compared to mere Rs 18.73 crore in 
1964. He growth of the investible funds has been substantial as is clear from table:2.The percentage of US 64  in 
total investible funds to UTI is, of course decreasing which is very obvious from the fact that more and more 
investors’ friendly schemes have been introduced in recent past but still it is the biggest funds managed by UTI. 
                              [Insert Table-3 here]   
   On dividend front, the pace has been again very slow. Although for every first year, dividend was declared but 
it was only 6% and it touched double figure only in 1979-80 when dividend rate was 10%.As is evident from the 
table-3, subsequently, the increase in dividend has been comparatively better and it reached  6% in 1992-
93.Similar, yield on July price has been constantly increasing till 1991-92, but suddenly a downward trend set in 
as it decreases from 17.86 in 1991-92 to  Rs. 17.45 in 1992-93 and further to Rs. 15.75 in 1994-95. It has given 
an alarming signal to investors specially individual and small investors about the return on US 4 investment. 
                            [Insert Table-4 here]   
   Investment pattern among the mutual fund is the key information to understand the investment behavior of 
each fund manager.UTI’s exposure to equity is less compared to that of public sectors and private sectors mutual 
funds. While UTI invests nearly 53% of its aggregate investments in equity shares , the corresponding ratio for 
public sector and private sector mutual funds are 69% an 92% respectively. In case of UTI, there has been a 
drastic increase of investment held in equity from Rs 3811.6 crore in 1990-91 to nearly Rs 28,000 crore in 1994-
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95 and as a percentage of total investment, it has gone up from 28% to 52%at the end of 1994-95.One of the 
significant trends in UTI’s investment is that the shares of debentures and bonds has come down significantly 
over the last five years (as depicted in the table 5)from 32% in in 1990-91 to 22%in 1994-95.With the launching 
of more close ended growth funds, specially after 1990-91, the pattern of investment has been shifted  towards 
equity related instruments. It is evident from table 5 that till 1990-91, more than 70% of investment has been 
held in fixed income securities and at the end of 1994-95, their shares slipped to nearly 47%. 
   UTI’s exposure to government securities market had witnessed a significant decline from more than 26% of its 
total investments in 1990-91 to nearly 18% in 1994-95. Nevertheless, UTI remains to be the leader among 
mutual funds with more than 98% shares of the total industry exposure in government securities. Moreover, 
although UTI’s investment in equity rises from 28% in 1990-91 to 52% in 1994-95 and UTI holds the dominant 
position (more than 70%) in equity investment than public and private sector mutual funds, there has had been a 
gradual decrease in percentage of total equity investment of UTI in the industry because of the entry of more 
public sector and private sector mutual funds. 
    At present, in the yardstick of performance of some schemes of UTI mutual fund, UTI is trying its best to 
regain lost soil by removing all defames.NAV has increased much in some popular schemes like master plan, 
master growth, master share, grand master, master gain. 
As regard fund mobilization, UTI shows steady upward trend in mobilizing fund since 2002-03. In 2002-03, 
UTI mobilized 2.25% of total mobilization of the mutual fund industry which increases to 7.80% in 2008-
09.But due to crisis faced by UTI during 2002-03, huge redemption including repurchase is gradually taking 
place which  reduces the net inflow of fund in the sector. As a result, in some of the years after 2002-03, 
redemption being higher than gross mobilization of fund, net inflow of funds becomes negative which is a 
danger signal to the sector. 
                              [Insert Table-5 here]   
5. Challenges faced by UTI: 
 Crisis started: 
The dividend payment in US 64 scheme rose from 14.25% in 1984-85 to 26% in 1992-93 and also reduced to 
20% in 1996-97. The equity investment of UTI rose from 28.24% in 1990-91 to 52.11% in 194-95 and in 1997-
98, equity investment had risen to 63%. During 90s, bullish stock market enabled UTI to earn huge amount of 
profit by investing its fund in equity market which is highly volatile rather than investing in bond market. In 
1994-95, share market reached a peak phase of bullish condition and after that “Bull run” continued for a couple 
of years. So, during that phase UTI gained much by investing nearly 63% of its investible fund in equity shares. 
But, it is well known that share market moves on “Euphoria”. In the mean time, Harshad Metha’s share scam 
took place which had shaken the confidence of investors and share  market was in troubled water. 
  Fund managers of UTI should have understood that by investing maximum investible fund in equity market, 
UTI could not pay 26% or similar rate of dividend steadily to the investing public who wants to have regular 
high rate of dividend. This is because of the fact that capital market is highly volatile and uncertain. The basic 
principle to be followed by intending investors of capital market is that they should enter into market in times of 
gradually rising state but offload holding when market is still good leaving the expectation of earning more. 
   The mistake which UTI had committed is that they could not pick up or liquidate their funds from market in 
right times. The principle of diversification of portfolio management suggests not to keep all of eggs in same 
busket. UTI has also committed mistake in that respect that they had kept more than 63% of their investible fund 
in uncertain market which can never generate uniform rate of earnings. 
   The question of suspicion regarding transparency of UTI’s activities was evolved around the minds of 
investors of how their funds are being managed and protected as UTI since its inception in 1964 did not disclose 
the daily NAV of their popular schemes. 
   Evaluation of performance through examination of total returns generated in the form of dividend and capital 
appreciation is the general trend. But, such form of evaluation may not be depicting a correct picture. A mutual 
fund scheme might be providing excellent returns but this performance might be solely due to bullish stock 
market. So, performance of UTI should be judged in the light of growth in NAV (Net Asset Value). UTI 
computes NAV as (Unit capital +Reserve&surplus+ Net appreciation of all listed &unlisted securities+all 
interest and dividend income)-(Amortization of issue expenses+stamp fees+handling charges) / outstanding unit 
capital. 
    The NAV incorporates both the realized as well as unrealized capital appreciation. The realized capital 
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appreciation joins the income stream. As because  unrealized capital appreciation is dependent upon the market 
prices in case of listed securities, the NAV could also up or down depending upon the market prices of 
underlying securities . So, NAV would always be relevant in the context of a particular date. So, NAV is the 
most comprehensive measure of the value of a unit of a scheme as it represents the intrinsic value of the scheme. 
From the formula adopted by the UTI, it is certain that payment of dividend implies a decline in the 
NAV .Rather, it can be said that schemes having a regular distribution of income by way of dividend would have 
lower NAV than schemes which accumulate the income and do not make annual payment. The longer the 
scheme has run, the more time it would have to plough back profit and built up reserves and is likely to have 
higher NAV than a recent scheme. 
  To conceal the operational inefficiencies in capital market and mismanagement of funds, UTI declared higher 
rate of dividend in 1998-99 out of accumulated reserve built up in the past. As a result during 1999-2000, 
reserve account showed a negative balance of around Rs 3400 crores which depleted NAV of unit scheme to Rs 
5.94 a unit. 
        The major reason why US-64 has not been made NAV based appears to be the fact that there is a 
substantial gap between the repurchase price of the unit and its NAV. This gap increases or decreases depending 
upon the market price of US-64’s portfolio. Redemptions take place at prices which are not linked to the NAV 
and in periods where redemptions exceed sales, as happened in April and May 2001, net redemptions at values 
in excess of the NAV further widen the gap in respect of continuing unit holders. Moreover, since US-64 has in 
its portfolio large blocks of shares in individual companies, its ability to create liquidity immediately by selling 
the shares in the market is restricted, as large sales would depress market prices and further widen the gap. 
Finally, given the fact that the composition of its portfolio has significantly changed with a larger share of 
equity, its ability to pay dividends is conditioned on booking profits on sale of investments which further 
increases the gap.  
                 There is a public perception that once a repurchase price of US-64 is announced in July of a year, the 
repurchase price and sale price of the unit will progressively increase during the year until a fresh sale and 
repurchase price is announced in the following July, when sales and repurchase are resumed after the end of the 
period of closure of books. US-64 has been marketed on that basis. Though there is no legal bar for UTI to 
reduce the repurchase price even during the year, this probably is the reason why the repurchase prices were not 
progressively adjusted downwards when the gap between the repurchase price and the NAV started widening. It 
is however unfortunate that the opportunity was not taken to make the scheme NAV based when for a brief 
period, within the period of three years specified by the Deepak Parekh Committee, the NAV is believed to have 
been in excess of the repurchase price or in July 2000 when the gap between the repurchase price and NAV is 
believed to have significantly narrowed. 
       The confidence of unit trust’s customer had been shaken in 2001 from its flagship –US 64 fund as 
technology Stocks tumbled and insider trading scandal roiled the stock market. The decline prompted unit trust 
to freeze redemption from the fund temporarily which a 1988 survey of households ranked as India’s market 
value of its assets forced Govt. to underwrite all liabilities to bolster investors’ confidence. The US 64’S NAV 
has risen to Rs 10 a unit from Rs 5.94 when the figure was first disclosed on 31st December,2001 by giving 
Govt. subsidy.  
Actual crisis of UTI emerged during 1999-2001: 
UTI and controversies go hand in hand .Premature redemption of Rajlakshmi Unit Scheme(RUS) and reduction 
of yield on MIP (Monthly Income Plan) showed the danger signal. Another issue i.e the problem of US 64 that 
has snowballed has been hogging all the headlines in all dailies. The then current state of affairs at UTI has 
claimed one victim in its chairman who has been suspected to engage in insider trading. The real issue is that of 
continued mismanagement in US 64 in spite of having been chastised a year earlier and that of repetition of 
glaring mistakes made with pubic money. It is true that fund size of US 64 itself was a problem. Its restructuring 
was a mammoth task. What was needed was a lot of time. But, the key question is that why were the 
recommendation of previous committees not implemented to revive US 64.  
The recent crisis was not certainly unexpected because of the portfolio of the scheme, while other mutual fund 
houses had decided to move out of tech share, UTI entered late and was trapped in it.Due to its large size, UTI 
could not even sell in bulk because market would have clashed again. But, while the size has certainly a problem 
with UTI , it has to do with poor fund management. 
The Govt. of India has not hinted another bail-out but the way it has raised the issue of protecting the investors’ 
interest by giving them Rs 10 a unit on redemption, this will not solve the problem because as soon as the 
scheme is flush with funds, redemption might start in a giant step and investors might not stay untouched and 
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could lead to similar problem in future. 
However, doubts arose on the intrinsic value of its scheme(NAV) coupled with the fact that there are few takers 
for the scheme because all corporate houses have made a killing out of the scheme at the expenses of small 
investors by liquidating their position in the month preceding the crisis.  
Many banks and corporate houses offloaded their US 64 holding in April-May 2001 triggering large scale 
redemption of the unit. The heavy scale corporate redemption was suspected due to insider trading . The list of 
financial intermediaries which sold their US 64 holding includes Bank of Baroda, Bank of India and a host of 
other public sector banks. Telco, Bajaj Auto and Bombay Dying are some of the corporate houses which have 
redeemed their US 64 units. Bajaj Auto which had more than 50 million units of US 64 has sold off a part of its 
holding in 2001 and other corporates like Videocon and Indian Oil Corporation followed the same path. In fact, 
funds have seen total mobilization of Rs 2661 crores as against redemption of Rs 5962 crores during that period 
out of which a significant Rs 4151 crores was due to withdrawals by the corporate sectors. 
     As per the disclosed portfolio in April, 2001, the fund had 20% exposure to GOI papers. Its top equity 
holding include Reliance India Ltd, ITC, RPL and Infosys. The UTI MF has picked up the right stocks but the 
problem seems to be of the timing of investment as UTI has not offloaded its holding when market was still 
good. Infact, the Trust had the opportunity to shift to NAV based pricing in 2000 when its market value was 
close the actual NAV. But the UTI has not prepared for the switch. So, it has lost the golden opportunity. 
From the above analysis, the following points emerge: 
(i) Till 1987, UTI was the sole offerer of the mutual fund schemes in the market with only a few schemes. 
The product life cycle of these schemes had not been studies properly as UTI enjoyed monopoly in the market 
till 1987. With the entry of public sector as well as private setor mutual funds with attractive schemes during 
recent times, UTI confronted competition from several fronts. As a result, shares of UTI’s investment in the 
industry is gradually decreasing as the public and the private sector mutual funds capture a substantial portion of 
total resource mobilization in the industry which is cause of concern to UTI’s fund managers. 
(ii) One point which is to mention here is the irregularity and uncertainty in management and control of 
UTI funds which had a deterrent effects in the mutual fund industry, After al, mobilization of savings, the most 
important factor for any mutual fund market development, depends to a great extent on public confidence. If 
such confidence is lost, savings mobilization will be at jeopardy. The bad performance of Morgan Stanley which 
entered the market in January,1994 with a collection of Rs 981 crore had shaken the confidence of investors to a 
great extent. It is found from the mobilization of savings pattern of mutual fund industry including UTI that 
although UTI had been able to garner more than 75% of total fund mobilized by the industry, its share has fallen 
gradually during the recent times. 
 
(iii) The expectation of investors further hammered down by the poor investor services rendered by the 
operators. The investors who had relied on professional fund managers with the hope of performing better than 
they would have done on their own had bitter experience. The gradual increase in the repurchase of US 64, 
popular open ended schemes of UTI, had proved the lack of confidence on such schemes. Therefore, investors 
had lost their confidence on UTI mutual funds for many reasons including fall in NAV below face value in 
many cases, lack of liquidity due to thin trading in secondary market, poor investor services and unkept 
promises. An internal study on UTI showed that complaint ratio(proportion of complaints to outstanding 
accounts) rose from 0.11% in 1991-92 to 0.19% in 1993-94.(Ref. Mutual Fund: Management and Working-
L.K.Bansal). 
(iv) As far as profitability of the mutual fund investment of UTI is concerned, they had presented a dismal 
show, leaving the investors in a state of disillusions .During the pre-SEBI guidelines period, dividend 
distribution rate of UTI was gradually decreasing due to increased spending tendency (increase in operating 
cost, salary cost, salary cost, management fees due to opening up of more equipped franchise offices and 
introduction of technological upgradation project(TUP). It increases during post SEBI guidelines period only by 
transferring lessor amount to general reserve. 
7. Recommendations of the Deepak Parekh Committee for UTI’s bail- out : 
 1.        Initial contributors to UTI should infuse permanent funds of atleast Rs.500 crores.  
2.         The PSU portfolio should be transferred at book value to a Special Unit Scheme (SUS 99) to be 
subscribed for by GOI by the issue of dated GOI securities.  
3.        US-64 should make a strategic sale of its significant equity holdings by negotiation to the highest bidder 
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to ensure fetching the best value for the unit holder.  
4. (a)    The investment sub-limit of Rs.10,000 for tax benefit on Equity Linked Savings Schemes should be 
removed and benefit should be extended to US-64 and all schemes investing more than 50% in equity.  
    (b)   Income distributed by US-64 and schemes investing more than 50% in equity should be exempt from 
tax.  
5.         New schemes for investing in growth stocks in IT, Pharma and FMCG sectors should be launched, to be 
subscribed for by banks.  
6.         The size of the UTI Board should be increased to 15, with additional five members being co-opted by the 
Board.  
7. (a)    Trustees should assume higher degree of responsibility and exercise greater authority.  
    (b)   The remuneration of Trustees should be increased and their attendance record be published in the Annual 
Report. 
8.         There should be a separate Asset Management Company for US-64 with an independent Board of 
Directors. 
9. (a)    Chinese walls should be created by appointing separate and independent fund managers for each 
scheme.  
     (b)   Inter-scheme transfers must be based on independent decisions and requirements of concerned fund 
managers and at market determined prices.  
10. (a)  There should be an independent fund manager for US-64 with full responsibility and accountability.  
      (b)  The fund manager should be helped by a strong research team and the research capability should be 
strengthened.  
11. (a)  Investment/dis-investment decisions should be based on research analysts’ recommendations who should 
have the authority and responsibility of making the recommendations.  
      (b)  The fund manager should have the final authority and responsibility in decision making based on his 
perception of the market and research inputs.  
12.       The focus on small investors should be strengthened and the rhythm towards corporate investors 
reduced.  
13. (a)  US-64 should be NAV driven within three years.  
      (b)  If at the end of the three year period, the re-purchase price and the NAV are not in line, the Trust will be 
left with no alternative but to seek GOI support once again the provide the difference between the NAV and the 
repurchase price. Only a clear commitment from the GOI to stand by US-64 till it finally assumes the character 
of a NAV driven scheme will instill the required confidence in the US-64 investors.  
14.       The spread between sale and repurchase prices should be gradually increased to deter short term 
investors. 
15. (a)  The dividend distribution policy needs to follow a more conservative approach to build up sufficient 
reserves during periods of good performances.  
     (b)  As a rule, dividends need to be curtailed when there is inadequate income. 
16.       The rate of return offered to investors needs to be reviewed on a periodic basis. The yield offered on US-
64 is excessively high as compared to other comparable instruments. 
17.       The composition of the portfolio needs to be changed to provide for more weightage to debt consistent 
with the objectives of the Scheme.  
18.       The operations of US-64 should be brought under SEBI purview at the earliest.  
19.        An independent professional firm should be commissioned for a detailed review of asset management 
processes including back office, inter scheme transfer and investor servicing. 
8. Reconstruction programme undertaken: 
 In view of the problem of UTI, the Cabinet approved and passed ordinance to repeal the UTI Act, 1963 and 
amend the SEBI Act. This paves the way for recast of the UTI and overhaul of market watch dog, SEBI’s 
organizational structure. The decision has facilitated implementation of UTI bail-out package.  
     In February 2003, following the repeal of the Unit Trust of India Act 1963 UTI was bifurcated into two 
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separate entities. One is the Specified Undertaking of the Unit Trust of India with assets under management of 
Rs.29,835 crores as at the end of January 2003, representing broadly, the assets of US 64 scheme, assured return 
and certain other schemes. The Specified Undertaking of Unit Trust of India, would be managed by Govt. 
appointed administrators who would be assisted by a team of professionals and does not come under the 
purview of the Mutual Fund Regulations. 
    The second is the UTI Mutual Fund Ltd which is managed under SEBI’s umbrella with 47 schemes and a 
modest corpus of Rs 15000 crores which is just 1/5 th the size of UTI at its peak. Therefore, UTI mutual fund 
sponsored by four public sector entities like SBI, PNB, BOB and LIC is now SEBI’s compliant  
.   It is registered with SEBI and functions under the Mutual Fund Regulations. With the bifurcation of the 
erstwhile UTI which had in March 2000 more than Rs.76,000 crores of assets under management and with the 
setting up of a UTI Mutual Fund, conforming to the SEBI Mutual Fund Regulations, and with recent mergers 
taking place among different private sector funds, the mutual fund industry has entered its current phase of 
consolidation and growth. As at the end of September, 2004, there were 29 funds, which manage assets of 
Rs.153108 crores under 421 schemes. 
9.Issues to be considered in view of Strength &weakness: 
UTI is the largest player in the mutual fund industry with total investible funds of domestic schemes (at Market 
Value) as at 30th June, 2001 of Rs.56,057 crores constituting about 57% of the total investible funds of the 
industry. US 64 with a total unit capital as at 30th June 2001 of Rs.12,786 crores had a substantial share of these 
investible funds. It has certain unique strengths notable amongst them being :-  
(a)        Its large size with consequential economies of scale;  
(b)        Its nation-wide well entrenched distribution network and consequently its wide reach and capacity to 
mobilise large resources;  
(c)        Its brand image arising out of a public perception that the safety of funds is assured by its pseudo 
Government character, which may not be entirely unjustified.  
(d)       The fact that it does not have an AMC to whom management fees would have to be paid which results in 
higher returns available to unit holders.  
          It also has certain pronounced weaknesses :  
(a)       Being the largest player in the mutual fund industry, it also has large investments in individual 
companies. Its ability to turnaround its portfolio quickly is therefore somewhat limited.  
(b)       The fact that it combines within itself the roles of an AMC and the Trustee results in the absence of a 
degree of accountability which an AMC normally owes to the Trustee and the control which the latter enforces 
upon the former.  
(c)        There is a lack of transparency, particularly with regard to US-64 where the sale and repurchase price are 
not linked to the NAV and the NAV is not disclosed to the unit holder.  
(d)        The fact that UTI is perceived as having a pseudo Government character is as much its weakness as it is 
its strength, particularly in respect of US-64. While it enhances its ability to sell the units, it also gives a false 
sense of comfort which may not be true or even desirable. Moreover, in a highly competitive market, public 
perception of UTI as a pseudo – Government institution may affect its ability to attract and retain the best 
professional talent or to adequately motivate it.  
(i)    In view of the above strength and weakness, it is seen that in the initial stages, UTI had been performing a 
hybrid role of both a financial institution and a mutual fund. However, over the last few years, its role as a 
financial institution has significantly diminished and it has positioned itself purely as the largest mutual fund in 
the country. There is also a significant trend emerging which suggests that financial institutions will gradually 
wither away or merge into universal banks. In this scenario, commercial banks and mutual funds will emerge as 
the primary institutions for the mobilisation of household savings. This reinforces the need for UTI to evolve as 
a pure mutual fund. At the same time, consideration has to be given to the fact that UTI has promoted and holds 
controlling interest in a number of institutions outside the pure mutual fund industry.  
(ii)Greater transparency increases innovation. So, UTI should be transparent enough to product innovation and 
differentiation with attractive promises by deleting less attractive schemes. 
(iii)Better services which is the need of the day will make the UTI mutual fund schemes more investors’ 
friendly. Therefore, efforts should be made to tone up the marketing and distribution network by recruiting more 
efficient agents and by opening more fully equipment franchise offices. 
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(iv) The future of UTI as well as other mutual funds to a great extent depends on the response of regulatory 
agencies on the demand and expectations of small investors. It must set its house in order. Its association of 
mutual funds of India(AMFI) will have to outgrow itself from being a bargaining arm of the industry and 
emerge into a self regularity organization(SRO).It will have to turn proactive and stop waiting for the SEBI to 
wield the stick. 
(v)UTI’s management structure is at variance with the structure prescribed for mutual funds under SEBI 
regulations. These regulations provide for four separate entities, namely a Sponsor, an Independent Trustee, an 
Asset Management Company and the Fund. It is necessary that UTI as the largest player in the Mutual Fund 
industry should, as recommended by the Vaghul Committee, lend itself to SEBI’s regulatory jurisdiction and 
conform to the form of structure prescribed in SEBI regulations. As stated earlier, out of 73 domestic schemes, 
67 schemes have already been brought under SEBI regulations and apart from US-64 and SUS-99, the 
remaining schemes have finally suspended sales and/or are nearing termination. It only remains for the structure 
of UTI also to be made SEBI compliant.  
    (vi) While the present structure of UTI provides for separate Asset Management Committees for US-64, 
equity schemes and for income/debt schemes, the degree of control exercised and direction imparted by these 
Committees appears to be restricted and inadequate. The key mandate of the Committees is to review 
performance of unit schemes of UTI and provide guidance. The Committees discharge this role of independent 
review of scheme performance through the mechanism of periodic meetings. Given the limitation of a “review 
committee” format, the Committees have not found it possible to resolve “embedded” problems stemming from 
“historical” decisions. The Committees, therefore, cannot replace Asset Management Companies. There is 
therefore need for an independent  Trustee and an independent AMC, as provided under SEBI regulations with 
wider powers of control and direction.  
       (vii) UTI has no identified Sponsor but the institutions which contributed to the initial capital of Rs.5 crores 
and the additional amount of Rs.445.5 crores in 1999 may be considered as Sponsoring Institutions. SEBI 
regulations impose certain responsibilities and obligations on sponsors and it would be difficult to discharge 
these responsibilities and obligations when there are a large number of sponsors. It is therefore necessary that 
the Sponsor should be a separate company. It is suggested that this company can be formed with the initial 
shareholders being the Sponsoring Institutions who will convert the whole or part of their present holdings in 
the initial capital of Rs.5 crores and the additional contribution of Rs.445.50 crores made in June 1999 into the 
capital of the Sponsoring Company. This conversion can be made at the NAV of the units when US-64 becomes 
NAV based. It is desirable that no single member of the Sponsoring Institutions ultimately holds more than 25% 
of the ultimate capital of the Sponsoring Company, particularly since many of them already own or has 
participation in AMCs managing other mutual funds.  
(viii)UTI because of its strengths, mainly in the area of its large unit holder base and distribution network and its 
low operating costs when related to its investible funds could command a premium over the value of its assets. 
Against this there has to be set-off its contingent liabilities, particularly in respect of its assured return schemes.  
    (ix) Participation by Government in the sponsoring company may strengthen the perception  of implied 
responsibility of the Government for the due fulfillment of obligations by UTI but this responsibility may be 
open-ended and Government may not wish to accept such a responsibility. However, non-participation by 
Government in the sponsoring company may not by itself remove the perceived link between the Government 
and UTI so long as Government continues to exercise powers such as the power to appoint the Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees under the UTI Act.  
        (xi)   Though UTI continues to be the largest player in the Mutual Fund industry in India, it not longer 
enjoys a virtual monopoly. It has to face increasing competition from the newly formed mutual  funds, as a 
result of which, even when its investible funds were growing, its market share was declining. If it has to meet 
this competition, it has to shed the image of a public sector organization, attract and retain the best talent, 
remunerate its staff at competitive rates and function as a professionally managed institution, independent of 
Governmental influence and control.  
(xi)UTI has total investible domestic funds at market value as at 31st July 2001 of Rs.54,223 crores of which 
Rs.24,704 crores is represented by investments in equities and Rs.29,519 crores by investment in other 
instruments. The investments in equities include several large blocks of investments in individual companies 
which may not be possible or desirable to liquidate through open market operations atleast in the near term. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure that control over these large funds and particularly over the large blocks of equity 
investments in individual companies is not allowed to rest absolutely in any single person or group.  
 (xii)   It is also a matter for consideration whether US-64 can survive in its present form. It is perceived as a 
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pre-dominantly savings instrument and its investor profile is determined on that basis. However, the pre-
dominance of equity in its asset portfolio, makes it more akin to a growth fund. Therefore, recognition has to be 
given to the fact that US-64 has infact become a growth fund and given the present profile of its investment 
portfolio its ability to declare dividends and give a return to unit holders is severely restricted. 
(xiii)Quick liquidity and higher returns in future will make its schemes more investors’ friendly. Investors’s 
perception is changing fast. Their expectations from such mutual fund will be increasing day by day which 
increases operating cost. To check on operating expenses (which is a cause of concern for UTI) will be crucial. 
(xiv) Poor use of investment alternative is one of the reasons for not providing better dividend yield to 
investors.During the bearish trend in equity market, UTI’s strategy should be likely to maximize downward 
protection to the value of the investors’ wealth and concentrate on strengthening the brand equity of the existing 
product as also on offering units under debt oriented schemes.This aspect should be taken into consideration 
during the bearish sentiments of the market. 
10. Conclusion: 
Investor should ignore the whole bail-out programme and look at UTI schemes purely on performance basis. In 
fact, the yardstick to evaluate UTI would be the performance of which is now officially called UTI mutual fund 
Ltd which is a NAV based sector. The full effect of change of NAV based schemes may be evident over a long 
period of time. The performance of NAV based schemes would then provide a good indicator on whether UTI is 
a fund in which investors can report confidence. 
There are few other threats which Indian mutual fund is currently facing. Mutual funds must realize that there 
are some small saving schemes like NSC and PPF which are still offering high return than debt and income 
funds. Too much focus is being given to equity and any downswing in equity market would severely dent 
investor’s confidence. Again, there is a lack of investor education which results in risk-return mismatch for 
investors investing in mutual funds. However, it can be said, in coming years, mutual fund industry is going to 
take off to newer heights. The Indian equity market has seen unbelievable rise in the last couple of years. From 
an index level of 5,590 as at March 31, 2004 to 19000 December, 2010, the markets have moved in top gear, at 
breathtaking speed, tumbling records after records in this unrelenting journey. The Reserve Bank of India has 
relaxed norms for overseas investments thereby opening up more investment avenues. In recent years, SEBI has 
taken several steps to consolidate the Indian MF industry. There are some changes in guidelines that include 
standardization of the Funds Portfolios and disclosure of the balance sheet of the fund. The present structure of 
funds is likely to change from the three - tier framework. This is expected to streamline the operations of the 
funds and will give them more flexibility. Finally, though mutual funds are primarily composed of stocks, there 
is a slight difference between these two which makes mutual funds more advantageous to the common investors. 
Diversification is the biggest advantage associated with mutual funds.  
      In conclusion, it can be said with a note of optimism that UTI mutual fund will meet the challenges of the 
future with its dedicated human resources, vast reservoir of funds  and past track record. ‘Speed, quality and 
transparency’ is the edifice on which it desires to stride ahead for the benefit of its investor because in 
competitive world, their would be little place for those who make a habit of losing. Competition will drive the 
fund to become more transparent .Therefore, despite few problems, the recent changes in the mutual funds 
industry in India has really favoured its amazing growth and  in years to come, again mutual funds will continue 
to be a significant resource mobilizer in the Indian financial market. 
 Reference: 
Carhart, M,1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance, vol.52,pp57-82. 
Annual Report ,Unit Trust of India,(Several issues) 
The Economic Times, 21st December, 2006 
The Economic Times, 3rd January, 2007 
Gupta Shasi, K. and Sharma R. K., Financial Management, Kalyani Publishers. 
Van Horne, J. C. (1995), Financial Management & Policy, Prentice Hall 
The Economic Times, 3rd December, 2006 
The Hindu, 6th May, 2006. 
Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Securities Market,2009. 
P. Hanumantha Rao and Vijay kumar Mishra, Mutual Fund: A resource mobilizer in financial market, 
Vidyasagar University Journal of Commerce, Vol.12, March, 2007. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 2, No 5, 2011 
45 |  P a g e
www.iiste.org  
Kaushal shah and associates, Rise and fall of mutual funds in India, 2007. 
 
               Table: 1: Income &Expenditure profile of UTI (Rs crore) 
Items/years 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
Expenses 113.25(4.06%)* 
(4.62%)** 
 
415.62(9.44%)* 
(9.77%)** 
611.23(11.22%)* 
(14.68%)** 
Income distributed 2336.38(83.86%)* 
(81.51%)** 
2984.34(60.63%)* 
(58.02%)** 
3412.65(62.63%)* 
(59.32%)** 
General Reserve 232.82(11.62%)* 
(13.10%)** 
1334.16(27.11%)* 
(28.92%)** 
480.47(9.92%)* 
(11.25%)** 
Others 17.46(0.63%) 
(0.93%)** 
208.90(4.24%)* 
(3.95%)** 
945.67(17.35%)* 
(14.89)** 
Income generated 2785.89 4921.83 5449.16 
*Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentage to total income of UTI. 
** Figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentage to total income of the mutual fund industry. 
Source: UTI Annual Report (compiled). 
 
                 Table:2: US 64 and investible funds of UTI(Rs. In crore) 
Year/Schemes Close ended 
fund 
Open ended funds Total funds of 
UTI 
% of US 64 in 
total funds 
US 64(Rs.) Others(Rs.) 
1989-90 4966.00 10354.10 2330.80 17650.90 58.7 
1990-91 7257.50 11262.00 2857.00 21376.50 52.7 
1991-92 16990.80 10532.00 4282.90 31805.70 33.1 
1992-93 20273.10 13058.00 5645.80 38976.90 33.5 
Source:UTI Annual Report, 1989-90 to 1992-93. 
 
           Table:3: Dividend and Yield patterns of US-64(Face value Rs.10) 
                                                                                                               
Year July Price Dividend(%) Yield on July(% rate) 
1984-85 12.60 14.25 11.31 
1985-86 12.75 15.25* 11.96 
1986-87 12.85 16.00 12.45 
1987-88 13.00 16.50 12.69 
1988-89 13.20 18.00** 13.65 
1989-90 13.40 18.00 13.43 
1990-91 13.75 19.50 14.18 
1991-92 14.00 25.00 17.86 
1992-93 14.90 26.00 17.45 
*Includes 0.50% bonus dividend. 
** Includes 1% Silver Jubilee Dividend. 
Source:UTI Annual Report(Several issues). 
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                 Table:4: Investment pattern of UTI Mutual fund (Rs. in crore) 
Year/Avenues 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
Equity Shares 3811.63 
** 28.24% 
(86.92%) 
8382.33 
28.24% 
(75.67%) 
14390.16 
47.29% 
(77.48%) 
20410.49 
46.93% 
(76.10%) 
27890.67 
52.11% 
(74.94%) 
 
Debenture&bonds 4371.55 
32.39% 
(88.34%) 
6076.00 
27.36% 
(71.07%) 
8718.05 
28.65% 
(74.74%) 
10985.70 
25.26% 
(76.66%) 
11847.59 
22.14% 
(79.52%) 
Term Loans 1752.72 
12.99% 
(96.11%) 
2664.34 
12.00% 
(98.21%) 
3596.04 
11.82% 
(99.51%) 
4093.03 
9.41% 
(99.96%) 
4122.21 
7.70% 
(99.96%) 
Govt. securities 3561.66 
26. 39% 
(98.44%) 
 
5083.87 
22.89% 
(99.01%) 
3724.63 
12.24% 
(95.30%) 
8001.55 
18.40% 
(98.26%) 
9658.58 
18.05% 
(98.65%) 
Others* 0.23 
0.00% 
(0.11%) 
0.81 
0.00% 
(0.15%) 
1.29 
0.00% 
(0.11%) 
0.00 
0.00% 
(0.00%) 
0.00 
0.00% 
(0.00%) 
Total 13497.80 
(90.10%) 
22207.36 
(79.32%) 
30430.17 
(78.11%) 
43490.77 
(80.49%) 
53519.05 
(80.68%) 
Industry 
Aggregate 
14981.36 27998.22 38956.79 54033.83 66337.68 
*Other investments include CPs and CDs and call paid in advance. 
**Italic figures indicate the percentage to the total investments of UTI mutual fund. 
Figures given in the parenthesis indicate the percentage to the industry’s total investment in the respective item. 
  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 2, No 5, 2011 
47 |  P a g e
www.iiste.org  
Table: 5: Recent trend in Resource mobilization by UTI & other mutual funds in India (Rs crore) 
Year Gross mobilization Redemption* Net Inflow 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
UTI Total Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
UTI Total Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
UTI Total 
93-94 1549 9527 51000 62076 - - - - - - - - 
94-95 2084 2143 9500 13727 - - - - - - - - 
95-96 312 296 5900 6508 - - - - - - - - 
96-97 346 151 4280 4777 - - - - - - - - 
97-98 1974 332 9100 11406 - - - - - - - - 
98-99 7847 1671 13193 22710  1336 15930 23660 1453 335 -
2737 
-949 
99-
2000 
43726 3817 13698 61241 6394 4562 9150 42271 15166 -745 4548 18970 
2000-
01 
75009 5535 12413 92957 28559 6580 12090 83829 9850 -1045 323 9128 
01-02 147798 12082 4643 164523 65160 10673 11927 157348 13050 1409 -
7284 
7175 
02-03 284096 23515 7096 314706 134748 21954 16530 310510 12069 1561 -
9434 
4196 
03-04 534649 31548 23992 590190 272026 28951 22326 543381 42545 2597 1667 46808 
04-05 736463 56589 46656 839708 492105 59266 49378 837508 7600 -2677 -
2722 
2200 
05-06 914703 110319 73127 1098149 728864 103940 69704 1045370 42977 6379 3424 52779 
06-07 1599873 196340 142280 1938493 871727 188719 134954 1844508 79038 7621 7326 93985 
07-08 3780753 346126 337498 4464377 1520836 335448 327678 4310575 133304 10677 9820 153802 
08-09 4292751 710472 423131 5426354 3647449 701092 426790 5454650 -34018 9380 -
3658 
-28296 
* Includes repurchase as well as redemption. 
Note:  
1. Erstwhile UTI has been divided into UTI mutual fund (registered with SEBI) and the Specified Undertaking 
of UTI (not registered with SEBI).Above data contains information only of UTI Mutual fund. 
2. Data in respect of Specified Undertaking of UTI are included upto January, 2003. 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Securities Market,2009. 
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